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 Are Journalists to be Punished 
for Doing their Job?
TRINE BAUMBACH1*
1. Introduction
‘Are journalists to be punished for doing their job?’ This is a question that is frequently 
asked by journalists when journalistic working methods or conduct are on the agenda. As 
elegant as the question is from an oratorical point of view, it is impossible to answer with 
a firm yes or no from a legal point of view. 
 Firstly, it is necessary to point out that journalists generally are free to do all the 
things people outside their occupation are allowed to. They are not restricted by any spe-
cial article in the criminal law on journalistic conduct. Journalists are thus free to try to 
get an interview with a person – known or unknown to the public, in addition to be free 
to quote whoever he or she wants. Journalists are free to research a topic using all avail-
able, lawful means – searching the internet, looking up information in the library, calling 
on experts, carrying out on-the-spot investigations etc. In addition, journalists are free to 
go anywhere open to the public, or to private places, if invited. On the whole, journalists 
are free to do all the things people are free to do in a free society.  
 Secondly, it is to be noted that journalists cannot, in principle, be released from 
their duty to obey the ordinary criminal law on the basis that freedom of expression and 
their vital role as public watchdog endow them with special immunity from criminal lia-
bility. This applies to all the criminal law provisions that do not by their nature constitute 
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a limitation of freedom of expression – for instance research acts committed as part of the 
journalist’s data collection.1
 Despite this ascertainment of the facts, the reality is not always as simple. This is 
due to the fact that some topics are of such important public interest that they must be 
reported by the press. In these extraordinary situations the criminal law can appear to 
be an unnecessary obstacle to journalists in their research, in the sense, as will be argued 
below, that the balancing of the conflicting interests must result in favour of the public’s 
right to information. However, this is also due to the fact that some journalists disregard 
the law if they get what they themselves think is a good idea for an article or a broadcast. 
Some journalists may not perhaps disregard the law when doing their job, but however 
constantly attempt to challenge the legal boundaries set up by criminal law – and from 
time to time prove successful. 
 In the following, I will analyse different types of journalistic working methods 
and conduct which give rise to criminal proceedings against journalists and, in that con-
nection, emphasise why it is important to make legal distinctions between each of them. 
To begin with, I will briefly review the rules on journalists’ freedom of expression and 
provide some comments on the duties and responsibilities imposed on them. The anal-
yses will have their legal basis in the European Convention on Human Rights and the 
European Court of Human Rights (the Court’s) case law. Eventually, I will make some 
concluding remarks.
2. Freedom of Expression and Freedom of the Press – Article 10 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights
As stated several times by the Court, freedom of expression constitutes one of the essen-
tial foundations of a democratic society and one of the basic conditions for its progress 
and for the self-fulfilment of each individual.2 However, as set forth in Article 10 (2), 
freedom of expression is not absolute and is subject to exceptions. These exceptions must, 
however, be construed strictly, and in every single case the need for a restriction must be 
established convincingly. In this connection, it is crucial to bear in mind that freedom of 
expression is not only applicable to information and ideas that are favourably received or 
regarded as either inoffensive or as a matter of indifference. Freedom of expression also 
applies to information and ideas that offend, shock or disturb. The Court has pointed out 
1 E.g. unlawful purchase of weapons to show in an article or broadcast how easy it is. See further 
below. 
2 See Handyside v. the United Kingdom, appl. no 5493/72, 7.12.1976, para. 49 and Couderc and 
Hachette Filipacchi Associes v. France, appl. no. 40454/07, 10.11.2015 (Grand Chamber), para. 88.
104
Trine Baumbach
that this is a consequence of the demands of pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness, 
without which there would be no democratic society.3 In a media law context the Court 
has emphasised that journalistic freedom of expression also covers possible recourse to a 
degree of exaggeration or even provocation.4
 A part of freedom of expression is the right to information, or as stated in Article 
10, ‘to receive … information and ideas’.5 Freedom of the press is deduced from this right, 
as it is the task of the press to impart information and ideas on all matters of public in-
terest. Not only does the press have this task, the public has a definite right to receive the 
information and ideas. Without access to information from the press, the public does not 
have a genuine possibility to keep up with the developments in society. Neither do they 
have the possibility to debate matters of public interest and thereby sway developments, 
perhaps even turn the tide and change the direction of society. 
 Moreover, without information from the press, the public will be unable to mon-
itor whether the authorities or powerful private enterprises are acting within the frame-
work of a democratic society governed by the rule of law. In other words, the press has a 
special status in a democratic society, on behalf of the public, to play the role of, some-
times said, the ‘fourth power’ or as the so-called ‘public watchdog’.6 
As seen from the expression, the press is not just a watchdog, it is the public watchdog. 
The special status which the press and journalists enjoy in a democratic society in rela-
tion to freedom of expression is not enjoyed in their personal capacity, so to speak, but in 
their function as public watchdog.7
 As mentioned, the right to freedom of expression under Article 10 is not abso-
lute. Thus, according to Article 10 (2), freedom of expression can be subject to inter-
ference if the type of interference is prescribed by law and is necessary in a democratic 
society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection 
3 See e.g. Axel Springer AG v. Germany, appl. no. 39954/08, 7.2.2012 (Grand Chamber), para. 78. 
See also Lillo-Stenberg and Sæther v. Norway, appl. no. 13258/09, 16.1.2014, para. 28 and Gibbons, 
Media and Freedom of Expression: State Regulation is Necessary for Freedom of Expression, in 
Media and Human Rights, ed. Clemens Nathan, (Clemens Nathan Research Centre 2009) pp. 38 
ff. 
4 See among others Delfi AS v. Estonia, appl. no. 64569/09, 16.6.2016 (Grand Chamber), para. 132.
5 Including the right to internet access, see Ahmet Yildirim v. Turkey, appl. no. 3111/10, 18.12.2012. 
6 See Axel Springer AG v. Germany (n 3), para. 79. See also the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary 
Assembly Resolution 2035 (2015) final version, on Protection of the safety of journalists and of 
media freedom in Europe, Barendt, Freedom of Speech (Oxford University Press 2005) pp. 417 ff. 
and Jacobs, White & Ovey, The European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford University Press 
2014) pp. 444 ff.
7 See e.g. Kjølbro, Den Europæiske Menneskerettighedskonvention – for praktikere (Jurist- og 
Økonomforbundets Forlag 2010) pp. 760 f.
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of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received 
in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.
 It appears that, in its own review of a case in hand, the Court finds it to be of great 
importance whether the national courts in substance have conducted a proper examina-
tion of the case in accordance with Article 10 and the criteria identified and developed 
by the Court in previous case law.8 However, if a case concerns a matter of great public 
interest, the Court has emphasised that there is only little scope under Article 10 (2) to 
restrict freedom of expression.9
3. Duties and Responsibilities – Ethics of Journalism
The bedrock principles behind freedom of the press imply that the introductory remarks 
in Article 10 (2) on ‘duties and responsibilities’ have a special significance in press cases.10 
By reason of the duties and responsibilities inherent in the exercise of the freedom of ex-
pression, the safeguard given to journalists by Article 10, in relation to the reporting on 
issues of general interest, is subject to the proviso that they act in good faith in order to 
provide accurate and reliable information in accordance with the ethics of journalism,11 
‘even with respect to matters of serious public concern’.12 In this context it is of paramount 
importance that journalists view their sources critically and try to verify the relevant 
information.13 
 According to the Court, it follows from the ethics of journalism as well that be-
fore publishing an interview, a journalist must both verify that a statement made in one 
context is reproduced in such a way that, as regards content, it is adequate and that a di-
rect quotation is accurate. However, it is not permissible to require by means of criminal 
8 See e.g. Mikkelsen and Christensen v. Denmark, appl. no. 22918/08, 24.5.2011 (dec.), Hlynsdottir 
v. Iceland (No. 2),appl. no. 54125/10, 21.10.2014, para. 54 and 65, Lillo-Stenberg and Sæther v. 
Norway (n 3), para. 44, Niskasaari and Otavamedia OY v. Finland, appl. no. 32297/10, 23.6.2015, 
para. 58 ff. and Prompt v. France, app. no. 30936/12, 3.12.2015, para. 45 f. See also Jakobsen & 
Schaumburg-Müller, Medieretten (the Media Law) (Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forlag 2013) 
pp. 110 ff. and Baumbach, Strafferet og menneskeret (Criminal Law and Human Rights) (Karnov 
Group Denmark A/S 2014) pp. 344 f.
9 See e.g. Mondragon v. Spain, appl. no. 2034/07, 15.3.2011, para 50.
10 See also Harris, O’Boyle & Warbrick, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford 
University Press 2014) pp. 687 ff.
11 See among many others Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas v. Norway, appl. no. 21980/93, 20.5.1999 
(Grand Chamber), para. 65 and Cojocaru v. Romania, appl. no. 32104/06, 10.2.2015, para. 23.
12 See e.g. Axel Springer AG v. Germany (n 3), para. 82.
13 See Haldimann and Others v. Switzerland, appl. no. 21830/09, 24.2.2015, para. 46-47 and 
Ziembinski v. Poland, appl. no. 46712/06, 24.7.2012, para. 53 f.
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penalties that journalists are to obtain permission to publish an interview (conducted 
without subterfuge or deceit). Such a requirement would have a ‘chilling effect’ and a dev-
astating impact on the public’s right to receive information. This would apply even if the 
concrete sentence is lenient.14 Journalists and the media are also not under an obligation 
to inform individuals who appear in an article or a television broadcast, in advance, that 
material or information concerning them is to be published.15 Nor is the use of a hidden 
camera necessarily a breach of the ethics of journalism if used in accordance with the 
public interest and the subsequent broadcast of the recording is not distorted.16 
 In modern times, it is worth noticing that internet portal operators engaged in 
media publication are also required to act in accordance with the ethics of journalism.17 
In other words, it is not the medium, but the subject matter that determines the rules.           
4. The Individual Journalistic Working Methods and Conduct
Journalistic working methods or conduct, leading to a journalistic story that gives rise 
to criminal proceedings against a journalist, can be categorised in various ways. With 
reference to the Court’s case law, the following categories are suggested. First, I will deal 
with the issue of the journalistic reporting privilege, before looking into the two kinds 
of journalistic self-staged stories that give special rise to legal considerations. Then I will 
discuss crimes committed in connection with data collection, before finally making some 
remarks about journalists’ own defamatory statements. This categorization is not un-
equivocal, since some journalistic methods and conduct may belong to more than one 
category.18 However, in the light of the Court’s case law, this approach seems to be the 
most suitable. 
14 See in more detail Wizerkaniuk v. Poland, appl. no. 18990/05, 5.7.2011, para. 65 ff.
15 See Mosley v. the United Kingdom, appl. no. 48009/08, 10.5.2011, para. 106 ff. On ethics of 
journalism regarding the duty of the media to publish retort, see Kapersynski v. Poland, appl. no. 
43206/07, 3.4.2012, para. 67.
16 See Haldimann and Others v. Switzerland (n 13), para. 56 ff.
17 See Delfi AS v. Estonia (n 4), para. 113. However, the particular nature of the Internet implies 
that the duties and responsibilities that are to be conferred on an Internet news portal for the 
purposes of Article 10 may differ to some extent from those of a traditional publisher as regards 
third-party content. See also Albrecht & Andreassen, Etik for journalister på nettet (Ethics for 
journalists on the internet), (Forlaget Ajour Denmark 2014).
18 See also Barendt, An overlap of defamation and privacy?, 7(1) Journal of Media Law (2015) 
pp. 85 ff. Criminal provisions are not defined uniformly in each country and some acts may 
be criminalised in one country and ‘only’ met with civil sanctions in another country. In some 
countries the legal basis is reversed. This is e.g. the case in Norway where the criminal provisions 
regarding defamation were abolished as of 1 October 2015 and are now met only with civil 
sanctions (‘skadeserstatningslovens article 3-6a’).  
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4.1. Journalists’ Reporting Privilege
Since the Jersild judgment, it has been evident that punishing a journalist for assisting in 
the dissemination of statements made by another person in an interview would seriously 
hamper the contribution of the press to discussions of matters of public interest. Pun-
ishment should not be considered unless there are particularly aggravating reasons for 
doing so.19 This is so because news reporting based on interviews, whether edited or not, 
constitutes one of the most important means whereby the press is able to play its vital role 
of public watchdog. 
 However, impunity in this situation is not absolute and the right to freedom of 
expression can be surpassed if, for instance, the interviewee makes racist statements and 
it can be assumed that the motive of the journalist was to publish the racist statements in 
order to promote them.20 The same goes for defamatory statements. Analytically, these 
cases can be seen as being the indirect statements of the journalist her- or himself. 
 As seen from the Jersild judgment,21 a journalist is only discharged from liability 
if the topic of the interview is of some public interest and its publication is not motivated 
by an illegal objective. It is not possible to list all the topics that are of some public interest 
in an abstract and relevant way,22 but it is important to emphasise, as a main rule, that the 
more gross the statement, the harder it is to establish that the topic is of any public inter-
est. Whether the statement of an interviewee is relevant measured in relation to the topic, 
must also be part of the assessment. Likewise, it must be taken into account whether the 
statement was necessary to illuminate the topic. However, the final assessment must be 
based on the specific circumstances of the case in hand. When making such an assess-
ment, the point of departure is the main rule of reporting privilege.
4.2. Self-staged Stories and Committing Crimes
In Denmark, and presumably in most other countries, in their eagerness to author an 
article or broadcast a television or radio programme, some journalists self-stage stories 
in the sense that they devise problems or concerns that would not have existed had the 
journalist not invented them. These journalists do not report news, they create news. 
Such conduct can be criticised from a journalistic and credibility point of view. From a 
19 See Jersild v. Denmark, appl. no. 15890/89, 23.9.1994 (Grand Chamber), para. 35.
20 Ibid. para. 36.
21 Ibid. 
22 See Axel Springer AG v Germany (n 3), para. 90. 
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criminal legal perspective the focus must, however, be on whether the conduct leading to 
the invented story is lawful or not. If the conduct is lawful, all criminal law considerations 
are unnecessary. However, if the conduct is unlawful, the criminal legal considerations 
are complex. Some examples will demonstrate the issues in this regard.
 In 2004, after the tightening of security systems at airports in consequence of 
the terror attack on i.a. the World Trade Center Complex in New York City in 2001, a 
journalist, together with a photographer, went into a steak restaurant in the transit hall 
of Copenhagen Airport to collect a so-called steak knife. With the knife hidden in a 
newspaper, he went out to a departure gate. At the gate the photographer took his picture 
while he waved the knife in the air. They were seen and afterwards stopped by the security 
guards at the airport. The next day, the journalist had an article and his picture published 
in a newspaper. The incident gave rise to some further tightening of the access to cutlery 
in the airport’s restaurants. 
 The journalist was charged with illegal possession of a knife in a public place. 
The case went all the way to the Supreme Court where he was found guilty. However, the 
Supreme Court found that he should not be given any penalty, since the applicable law 
at the time of commission was somewhat vague and because of the journalist’s motive 
combined with the short period of time he was in possession of the knife. 
 The conviction in itself was based on the reasoning that the journalist had self-
staged the story, and that the unlawful act had not been necessary to reveal the lapse in 
security. This was true in the opinion of the Supreme Court, even though a lawful re-
search technique would have attracted less attention to the newspaper article.23 
 If one is to analyse the case from the standpoint of Article 10, it must first be not-
ed that the facts of the case fell within the ambit of the Article, since the unlawful act was 
journalistic research conduct. There was thus some kind of assumption that the journal-
ist’s conduct was covered by freedom of expression. However, this is just the preliminary 
part of the analysis, since the applicable criminal law provision does not by its nature 
constitute a limitation of freedom of expression. Thus, journalists as well as anyone else 
cannot, in principle, be released from their duty to obey the ordinary criminal law on the 
basis that Article 10 affords them protection. Some special element is required to reverse 
that. The Mikkelsen and Christensen case, which is very similar to the steak knife case, 
further demonstrates the legal position.
23 See U 2008.671 H. Later the same journalist took a ceramic knife though the security checkpoint 
in the same airport hidden in his underpants. Afterwards he went to a toilet, took out the knife 
and went to a departure gate where his picture was taken. Because this act was committed before 
his eventual conviction by the Supreme Court in the first case, he was found guilty but again not 
imposed any sanction. See the High Court´s judgment of 14 June 2010. 
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 Two journalists,24  preparing a documentary for a national television station about 
the import and distribution of illegal fireworks in Denmark – a very hot issue at the time 
– purchased illegal fireworks (eight chrysanthemum shells containing approximately two 
kilos of explosives). The journalists were not trained in the handling of fireworks. Con-
sequently, as they brought them in their car to a police station in central Copenhagen, 
they were putting local residents and passers-by in potential danger. The journalists were 
found guilty by the High Court of having acquired illegal fireworks without permission 
from the municipal authority, contrary to Section 7 of the Fireworks Act. Each was fined 
DKK 6.000 (approximately EUR 800). The journalists explained that their motive was to 
show how easy it was to buy illegal fireworks and to gather information about the suppli-
ers. They had filmed the purchase with a hidden camera. 
 In its judgment, the High Court acknowledged that the topic investigated by the 
journalists was of essential importance to society, and that the broadcast on television 
was deemed to have significant news and information value. However, the rules on the 
purchase of fireworks are based on compelling safety considerations and the journalists 
had not complied with these rules. The High Court ended this part of its judgment by 
stating that the journalists had independently planned and carried out a criminal act, that 
compelling reasons were required for obtaining impunity for the act and that there had 
not been such compelling reasons in this case. 
 The journalists applied to the European Court of Human Rights, where they 
claimed that the criminal conviction violated their right to freedom of expression as pro-
vided in Article 10 of the Convention. By its decision of 24 May 2011, the Court found 
that the application should be rejected as manifestly ill-founded in accordance with Arti-
cle 35 and declared it inadmissible. The Court’s reasoning is remarkable. 
 First, the Court established that, even though the criminal act involved journal-
istic research that did not in itself relate to freedom of expression, the facts of the case 
nevertheless fell within the ambit of Article 10. This had been uncertain until this deci-
sion. Next, the Court reiterated the phrase about journalists’ duty to obey the ordinary 
criminal law. The Court assigned great weight to the fact that the journalists were not 
convicted for having produced a television programme or for having raised criticism 
against the authorities; they had only been found guilty of having intentionally acquired 
the chrysanthemum shells in breach of the Fireworks Act. The Court observed that the 
journalists’ documentary programme had not been stopped or impeded in any way. 
 The Court also found it significant that it was not true, as claimed by the journal-
ists, that the criminal act was necessary to demonstrate the points made in the TV pro-
gramme. Furthermore, the Court assigned great importance to the fact that the national 
court had thoroughly examined the case and given relevant and sufficient reasons for the 
24 See Mikkelsen and Christensen v Denmark (n 8).
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necessity of sanctioning the journalists, and had done so in application of Article 10 of 
the Convention. Finally, the Court stated that the penalty imposed could not be consid-
ered excessive. 
 Notwithstanding the journalists’ duty to obey the ordinary criminal law, it is not 
insignificant that journalistic research conduct used in a journalistic documentary falls 
within the ambit of Article 10, even though the criminal law provision in question does 
not by its nature constitute a limitation of freedom of expression. This is so because re-
search conduct is by nature the foundation of journalism and the basis upon which all 
journalistic outcomes are achieved, and thereby a derivative of the public watchdog func-
tions. To this must be added that, only when the facts of a case fall within the ambit of 
Article 10, must the case be examined in accordance with that Article – also as regards 
the (severity of the) punishment. Such an examination is in itself a guarantee of a free 
press. 
 As seen from the Mikkelsen and Christensen decision, it is essential that, in their 
keenness to uphold the criminal law, national authorities do not punish the press for 
highlighting the critical state of affairs present in society. It is also essential that the na-
tional authorities distinguish between the criminal act and the journalistic outcome and, 
in that connection, refrain from stopping or in any way impeding the disclosure of the 
journalistic article or broadcast. It is the criminal act that may be subject to a criminal 
conviction, not the journalistic outcome as such.  
 In Denmark, and presumably in many other European countries, there have been 
several cases where journalists have self-staged stories and committed crimes in doing so. 
These cases have for example included the unlawful purchase of different kinds of weap-
ons, ammunition, pepper spray, narcotics and other unlawful items, in order to show 
how easy it is to get possession of them. They have also involved the unlawful destruction 
of animals in front of the camera in order to provoke discussion of the methods used, the 
use of false identity papers to get a driving licence or other official document in the name 
of another person to show how easy it is to do.25 
 The examples are ad libitum and are only limited by the imagination of journal-
ists. Because of this journalistic trend, it is very important that the national courts and 
the European Court of Human Rights keep a fairly firm hand in these cases. On the one 
hand, they must have a predominant main rule regarding the duties and responsibilities 
of journalists, thereby regarding the journalists’ duty to obey the ordinary criminal law 
in cases where the applicable criminal law provision does not by its nature constitute a 
25 See e.g. the District Court’s judgment (Københavns Byret) of 19 November 1997, the High 
Court’s judgment, U 2009.920 Ø, the District Court’s judgment (Københavns Byret) of 12 
November 2001, the High Court’s judgment, U 2001.723 Ø and the District Court’s judgment 
(Odense Byret) of 22 December 2010. As regards Norwegian case law see e.g. Rt. 1998 p. 34 and 
Rt. 2001 p. 1379.
Bergen Journal of Criminal Law and Criminal Justice • 1/2016
111
limitation of freedom of expression. On the other hand, given the underlying principles 
of freedom of expression, it is crucial that the courts leave room for impunity in cases 
where the topic is of essential importance to society in the proper sense of the word, and 
where the unlawful research conduct is actually necessary for the purpose of the jour-
nalistic product and the journalistic exposure is of great significance to society. These 
reasons must not be regarded cumulative since each of them is of significance per se if the 
research conduct shall be deemed to be within the law.
 As regard the first requirement, it is important to bear in mind that a lot of issues 
are of significance to society. This is, however, not sufficient. In these cases the topic must 
be of essential importance to society to be able to overrule the ordinary criminal law. 
 Particularly the requirement that the (otherwise) unlawful research conduct is 
actually necessary for the purpose of the journalistic product must be scrutinised careful-
ly – it is not enough to take the journalist’s word for it. This is because a gentle or lenient 
application of this prerequisite is likely to open the floodgates to unlawful acts perpetrat-
ed by journalists and thereby to deceive the rule of law. In that connection it is paramount 
to underline that the assessment is a legal assessment, not a journalistic.26
 Last but not least, the journalistic exposure must be of great significance to soci-
ety. In other words, there must be a real need to have the topic put on the public agenda 
in the interest of society.  
4.3. Self-staged Stories by Making Other People Commit Crimes
As a kind of subset of the aforementioned group of cases, there have been cases where 
a journalist creates news by inducing other people to commit acts of a remarkable kind 
so that the journalist can then report on them. In some of the cases the act amounts to a 
crime. 
 Obviously, the person who commits the crime is criminally liable, but the ques-
tion is whether the same applies to the journalist as the accomplice who instigated the 
crime. When assessing this question, it is paramount to bear in mind that, in her or his 
quest for a story, the journalist has induced or sometimes manipulated an otherwise in-
nocent person to commit a crime.   
 In one case, for example, a journalist made a radio listener stop by the nearest 
bakery and go in, buy a cake and then smash it into the face of the baker’s assistant just 
to see how she reacted and broadcasted the incident live on the radio.27 In other cases, 
the purposes as such have concerned more serious issues related to relevant problems in 
26 See along the same line Øy, Medierett for journalister (Media law for journalists) (Cappelen 
Damm A/S 2013), pp. 240 f. 
27 See the High Court’s judgment, U 2006.2172 Ø.
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the society, but the method used has still been reprehensible. For example, in Denmark 
sexism against women has been a great problem. To throw light on that topic some jour-
nalists announced for young men to sexually assault strange women in the street while 
taping it with hidden camera to illustrate everyday sexism and how women react to it.28 
In such cases, it follows from the fact that a third party’s physical integrity was violated 
that not only was the immediate perpetrator criminally liable but also the journalists. 
The premise for this application of the law is the journalist’s poor judgement and lack of 
appreciation of the seriousness of the crime. 
 In other cases, where no individual is harmed, the assessment is a bit more com-
plex, but it will still point in the same direction if the act is criminalised in the interest of 
social order in a wide sense of the term. For instance, this will be the case if a journalist 
induces young people to commit falsification of documents in order to prove that the 
security level regarding proof of age is too low, due to the fact that it is very important in 
a civilised society that official documents should be reliable.29 Moreover, the same jour-
nalistic documentation could have been obtained by lawful means. Journalists must also 
be criminally liable in cases where they induce people to vote in a referendum or election 
in the name of another person just to prove that it is possible.30 Electoral fraud is very 
serious and can as a consequence have the effect that the referendum or election must be 
rerun, with serious economic costs for society and the risk that a great deal of the voters 
do not bother to vote again. That would harm democracy and would damage the citizens’ 
trust in it.   
 It appears from cases like these that some journalists do not recognise the seri-
ousness of their acts and how they can harm society and democracy. Even though the 
issues of most of the journalistic products were of essential importance to society and 
thereby had significant news - and information value, this fact does not grant journalists 
a carte blanche to commit any kind of crime or to induce others to commit them. The 
predominant main rule regarding the duties and responsibilities of journalists, including 
the journalists’ duty to obey the ordinary criminal law in cases where the applicable crim-
inal law provision, does not by its nature constitute a limitation of freedom of expression, 
must not be neglected. Exceptions can only be made under extraordinary circumstances, 
as accounted for above.
28 See MX.dk 4. May 2015, p. 6.
29 See the High Court’s judgment of 20 March 2013.
30 See the District Court’s judgment (Rønne Byret) of 30 September 2005.
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4.4. Crimes Committed in Connection with Data Collection 
The case may be considered otherwise if a third party has committed a crime, but that 
crime was not instigated by a journalist. In this case, the journalist did not create news, 
but reported on news.
 This was, for instance, the case in Denmark where a third party of his own vo-
lition breached his duty of confidentiality and showed some confidential material to a 
journalist.31 The third party was found guilty as the immediate perpetrator,32 but the 
journalist was acquitted. The acquittal was well-founded, even though the journalist in 
his newspaper articles disclosed classified information which breached national security 
(which is a separate crime in Denmark). This was because the topic was of essential im-
portance to society, was highly discussed at the time, widely reported in the media, and 
because the journalist received the information without any kind of request. In addition, 
the harm done was of little account.
 This acquittal also fell in line with the Dammann judgment.33 In this case, Swit-
zerland was found to have violated a journalist’s freedom of expression. The journalist 
had been convicted by the national courts and sentenced to a low criminal fine of CHF 
500 (approximately EUR 325) for inciting another person to disclose an official secret. 
The facts of the case were as follows: the journalist investigated a spectacular robbery. 
In this regard he telephoned the public prosecutor’s office and spoke to an assistant. She 
helped him find out whether the persons arrested in connection with the robbery had 
any previous convictions. This was a violation of her duty of confidentiality since the 
information was an official secret.34 The journalist did not use the information, but the 
episode was discovered by accident. The case thus concerned the journalist’s common 
research- and investigative activities in connection with ordinary journalistic data col-
lection about events that had already happened. The case did not concern restraint of 
publication as such, or a criminal conviction following a publication. 
 The Court assigned weight to the following circumstances: the confidential in-
formation could have been obtained by other means, such as consulting case law reports 
or press archives; in the circumstances the national authorities’ justification of the con-
viction was not really relevant or sufficient; and the information had been of a kind that 
raised matters of public interest, given that the spectacular robbery had been widely re-
ported in the media. The journalist had not tricked, threatened or pressured the assistant 
into disclosing the desired information, so the national authorities had to bear a large 
31 See the District Court’s judgment (Københavns Byret) of 4 December 2006.
32 He did not ask for and was not granted by the journalist any kind of source protection. 
33 See Dammann v. Switzerland, appl. no. 77551/01, 25.4.2006.
34 The assistant was convicted and lost her employment in the Public Prosecutor’s office, but this 
case was not brought before the European Court of Human Rights.
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share of responsibility for the indiscretion committed by the assistant. Since the jour-
nalist had not made the information public, no harm had been done to the rights of the 
persons concerned. 
 Finally, the Court attached great weight to the conviction itself, since it amounted 
to a kind of censure that would be likely to discourage journalists from carrying out re-
search with a view to prepare an informed article on a topic of current affairs. Punishing a 
research activity like that would be likely to deter journalists from contributing to public 
discussions of issues affecting the life of the community, and was thus liable to hamper 
the press in its role as both a provider of information and a public watchdog.
 The Court’s reasoning is of significance and emphasises that the national courts 
must make an individual in-depth assessment in every case involving journalists and 
not just run on ‘judicial autopilot’ in these cases. Every relevant detail and aspect of the 
case must be carefully considered, and a proposed sentencing must be weighed against 
the consequences for the free press and the tasks of the press to provide information and 
serve as the public watchdog.
 This is not to say that, when reporting on current affairs and news, journalists are 
given a free rein to do as they like. The main rule is that, in their eagerness to report the 
news, journalists must not violate the rights of others. The notion of the free press does 
not in itself discharge journalists from obeying the ordinary criminal law.
     One kind of potential crime in connection with data collection is the use of a 
hidden camera. In Denmark this is not in itself criminalised. Journalists as well as other 
people are free to make use of a hidden camera in places that are open to the public.35 
If a recording is made without consent or other justifications in a place that is not open 
to the public,36 this will be punishable under Section 264 (a) of the Danish Penal Code. 
However, if the recording is made as part of research, criminal liability will depend on 
an assessment made in accordance with Article 10 of the Convention. The starting point 
for such assessment is that, even when reporting on matters of public interest, journalists 
must respect the law and must not infringe other people’s right to personal integrity. 
 In the Haldimann case,37 the Court was for the first time called upon to examine 
an application concerning some journalists’ use of a hidden camera to obtain informa-
tion on a subject of public interest. The journalists were convicted for having recorded 
and broadcasted an interview with a private insurance broker using a hidden camera. The 
broadcast was part of a television documentary intended to denounce the misleading ad-
35 This does not mean that any publication of the recording is permitted. This assessment depends 
on whether a recording contains information of a private nature which should be concealed 
from the public. The publication is also regulated by the ethics of journalism.
36 As is common practice with e.g. wedding parties where everybody takes pictures and photography 
has not been prohibited in advance. 
37 See Haldimann and Others v Switzerland (n 13). 
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vice provided by insurance brokers and thereby the inadequate protection of consumers’ 
rights, which was a hot topic in Switzerland at the time. The person filmed was not tar-
geted in a personal capacity but as a representative of a particular professional category. 
The broker’s face and voice were disguised in the broadcast. The journalists were fined 
because it was found that they could have used a different approach causing less harm to 
the broker’s private interests.
 First, the Court observed that the subject of the broadcast was part of a public 
debate of general interest.38 Furthermore, the Court observed that the documentary had 
not focused on the broker, but on specific commercial practices used within a particular 
professional category. The recording had not been made on the broker’s private premises 
or on the insurance company’s domicile.39 The journalists had acted in accordance with 
the ethics of journalism as defined by Swiss law and had thereby acted in good faith and 
on accurate factual basis. They had provided reliable and precise information.40 While the 
documentary reflected negatively on the broker, his face and voice had been disguised 
so that the interference with his private life had not been serious enough to override the 
public’s interest in receiving information on the alleged malpractice in the field of insur-
ance brokerage.41 It could not be considered a mitigating circumstance that the penalty 
imposed was lenient, because the conviction was liable to discourage the media from ex-
pressing criticism, even though the applicants had not been prevented from broadcasting 
their documentary.42
 It can be inferred from the Court’s judgment that: if the matter bears a signifi-
cant impact on a debate on a subject of general interest; if the recording takes place in a 
non-private area not belonging to the interviewee or her or his company; if the broadcast 
is focused on the professional conduct of a representative of a commercial company (not 
on her or him as a private person) and if in the broadcast due consideration is given to 
the interviewee’s privacy, the conviction of a journalist for using a hidden camera in her 
or his journalistic data collection and the broadcast of the recorded interview, infringes 
the public’s right to information – even if the penalty imposed is lenient. On the other 
hand, the Court’s judgment says nothing about what its finding would have been if the 
recording had been made on the premises of the interviewee or if the broadcast had not 
paid due consideration to her or his private life. 
 As regards the latter, the Bremner v. Turkey judgment is of great significance.43 
In this case the Court was again called upon to examine a case concerning the use of a 
38 Ibid., para. 56-58.
39 Ibid. para. 60.
40 Ibid. para. 61.
41 Ibid. para. 65.
42 Ibid. para. 67.
43 See Bremner v. Turkey, appl. no. 37428/06, 13.10.2015, para. 71 ff.
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hidden camera and the broadcast of the recorded. On this occasion the applicant was 
the journalistic target and the Court held that there had been a violation of Article 8 (the 
right to respect for private life). 
 The applicant was, besides his ordinary job, a sort of a Christian missionary. He 
had held a meeting with some people whom the applicant believed wished to learn more 
about Christianity. The meeting was filmed using a hidden camera. In the end of the 
meeting a journalist entered the room with a camera and a microphone asking the ap-
plicant for an interview about his activities. The recorded was broadcasted in a television 
documentary which, according to its presenter, concerned covert activities conducted 
in Turkey by ‘foreign pedlars of religion’. The applicant’s image was showed and it was 
neither blurred nor disguised. The applicant sued the presenter and producers of the 
programme, claiming damages, but his claim was dismissed by the Turkish courts.
 As in the Haldimann case, the Court observed that the subject of the broadcast 
– religious proselytising – was undeniably a matter of general interest.44 The programme 
had been critical, using offensive terms such as ‘pedlar of religion’ which amounted to a 
value judgment. As regards the method used, the Court ascertained that a technique as 
intrusive and as damaging to private life as a hidden camera must in principle be used 
restrictively. The Court underlined that the use of hidden cameras might prove necessary 
for journalists when information was difficult to obtain by any other means. However that 
tool had to be used in compliance with ethical principles and with restraint.45 As to the 
fair balance between the competing interests – the right to freedom of expression on the 
 one hand and the right to respect for privacy on the other – the Court observed that the 
applicant had not placed himself in the public arena. He had published an advertisement 
for the meeting, but this could not have led him to suspect that he might be the subject of 
public criticism. He thought that he was merely meeting a group of individuals interested 
in Christianity, and he had not during the meeting committed any illegal act. 
 Even though the topic of the broadcast was of general interest, the Court did not 
find any general-interest justification for the journalists’ decision to broadcast his image 
without blurring it. The applicant was not famous. Neither was the broadcasting of his 
image newsworthy and did not contribute to the topic in any useful way.46
 It can be inferred from the Court’s judgment that the broadcast must give due 
consideration to the individual’s privacy and that a fair balance must be struck between 
the competing interests, even if the subject is of an ‘undeniably’ public interest.
 In this connection it must be emphasised that the standard or yardstick is not 
whether the broadcast amounted to ‘good television’. Rather it is whether the broadcast 
44 Ibid. para. 72.
45 Ibid. para. 76.
46 Ibid. para. 82 f.
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per se contributed to the topic in a serious way and, on the whole, whether the shooting 
and broadcast exercised due caution. This includes the place of the recording (public or 
private place), the focus of the broadcast (professional conduct or the recorded person’s 
more or less private qualities), if the recorded person had placed him- or herself in the 
public arena, if the person had committed any illegal act and if the journalists had acted 
in accordance with the ethics of journalism and thereby acted in good faith and on accu-
rate factual basis and have provided reliable and precise information.
 Even with these criteria, the balancing is not easy to strike. This is due to the fact 
that freedom of expression and the role of the press as public watchdog – and thereby as 
the mouthpiece of the people and the entity, with the role of bringing up social problems 
for discussion and guaranteeing a healthy operation of democracy – are of great im-
portance to society. In many cases the press is not able to fulfil its task without bringing 
somebody in the soup, even with a hidden camera. This comes as an unavoidable price. 
On the other hand, not every topic is of genuine public interest and in many cases the 
broadcast of the recorded does not provide anything substantial to the illuminating of 
the topic, but is motivated by a desire to pin something on somebody to make ‘good 
television’. In these cases it is very important that the national courts – and in the end the 
European Court of Human Rights – uphold the principle of right to privacy. The latter 
principle is also protected by the Convention, which is of equal value and consequently 
deserves equal respect.47 
In some journalists cases the Court has stated that it 
is not for this Court, nor for the national courts for that matter, to substitute their own 
views for those of the press as to what technique of reporting should be adopted by 
journalists. In this context the Court recalls that Article 10 (art. 10) protects not only the 
substance of the ideas and information expressed, but also the form in which they are 
conveyed.48 
This statement has raised expectations among journalists and has been hopefully alleged 
in the pleadings of defence lawyers.49 
 When assessing this statement it is, however, important to take the standpoint 
that prior restraints, even on the press, are not in themselves incompatible with Article 
10. The Court’s statement about ‘technique of reporting’ must be read in that light and the 
statement must therefore be seen as a ‘warning’ to the national governments and courts 
not to impose in advance a too far-reaching kind of censorship to illegalise common 
journalistic practice.50 However, this is not the same as to say that journalists by needless 
47 See further below.
48 See e.g. Jersild v. Denmark (n 19), para. 31. See also Kjølbro (n 7) p. 760.
49 See e.g. U 2008.671 H (n 23).
50 See also Harris, O’Boyle & Warbrick (n 10) pp. 639 f.
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intrusion of privacy cannot be held liable if they overstep the necessary boundaries in the 
case at hand. In hidden camera cases, the striking of the right balance is of exceptional 
importance since the technique used is by nature intrusive and the broadcasting of the 
recorded can easily cause harm to the interviewee’s private interests.
Another possible crime connected with data collection is making unlawful searches 
of a data register at variance with the aim of the register. This will normally be in violation 
of the Data Protection Act and thereby a violation of the integrity of the person whom 
the data concerns. Sometimes illegal hacking is involved.51 The overriding main rule in 
these cases must therefore be that journalists are as liable as anybody else. This is actually 
important, since an individual’s personal data is gathered in all kinds of data registers in 
respect of every part of the individual’s private life. Freedom of expression does not grant 
journalists the right to misuse these data registers since this could have immeasurable 
consequences for the recorded person and thereby for the way modern society is organ-
ised. 
 The same applies if, for example, in order to get a visiting permit and obtain an 
interview with a prisoner, a journalist submits a false statement of her or his relationship 
with the prisoner or her or his business.52 This is due to the fact that the misuse of securi-
ty systems in the name of freedom of expression may result in the security system being 
tightened up, with an irreparable damage to the prisoners and to society as such. In the 
old days, prisoners were as a main rule not allowed visitors. This was detrimental to their 
psychological health and worked against their rehabilitation.  Because of that, the rules 
were amended and today it is possible for most prisoners to have visitors ‘under certain 
conditions’, precisely because consideration for the prisoner is not the only matter to be 
taken into account. Often there may also be powerful opposite considerations. If journal-
ists were granted impunity in these cases on the grounds of freedom of expression, this 
could not fail to have negative consequences.  
 In Denmark there have been several cases of journalists’ trespassing on private 
property in order to report on, for instance, demonstrations that took place on the prop-
erty. To start with, the journalists were convicted, but just after Denmark lost the Jersild 
case, the Danish Supreme Court became more sensitive to the Convention and its (spe-
cial) status in cases concerning journalists. Since then, a large number of trespassing 
51 This was the case in the British News of the World case and the Danish Se & Hør case (still 
pending). 
52 This was the case in Denmark. The journalist was fined for his false statement, but his newspaper 
article was not stopped or impeded in any way. See the District Court´s judgment (Assens Byret) 
of 18 August 2005.
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journalists has been acquitted.53 If a case on trespassing by journalists were to be referred 
to the Court for instance by the property owner,54 it must be expected that the Court will 
assign great weight to the topic of the demonstration and consider whether it is of signif-
icance to the public that the journalists report on it and do that from the ‘inside’. 
 It must also be expected that the Court will attach significant weight to whether 
there have been a serious violation of the owner’s right to privacy. In that connection, 
the Court will hopefully attach substantial weight to whether the demonstrators and 
the journalists were joined together in some kind of conspiracy, with the effect that the 
demonstration would not have taken place if the journalists had not been present, or the 
demonstration became (more) violent and ran out of control because of the journalists’ 
presence. 
 Hopefully, the Court will also assign weight to information concerning the jour-
nalists’ behaviour in general and to information about possible (other) crimes committed 
by the journalists at the scene. It is not easy to strike a balance because the press has the 
task to report on incidents in society and the public has a right to receive this informa-
tion. However, this very important task is not the only important value in the democrat-
ic society. Other people’s right to privacy is also of importance and must be attributed 
weight. As stated by the Court, these two rights (to freedom of expression and to privacy) 
are of equal value and deserve equal respect.55
 In Pentikäinen v. Finland the applicant, a media photographer, was apprehended 
during a demonstration that turned into a riot. Subsequently, he was convicted for dis-
obeying a police order to disperse. He was not imposed any sanctions. The Court did not 
find a violation of Article 10.
 The Court assigned weight to the fact that the police had not deliberately prevent-
ed or hindered the media from covering the demonstration. The applicant had not been 
prevented from carrying out his work as a journalist either during or after the demonstra-
53 The first case concerned a demonstration against a large bridge construction which the 
demonstrators opposed. The demonstration involved malicious damage to property in the then 
Minister for the Enviroment’s private garden. A journalist and a photographer followed the 
demonstration into the garden and stayed there as long as the demonstrators were there. See 
U 1994.988 H. This judgment was followed up by other judgments e.g. U 1999.1675 H, the 
District Court’s judgment (Københavns Byret) of 3 December 1997, the High Court’s judgment 
(Østre Landsret) of 28 August 2008 and the District Court’s judgment (Frederiksberg Byret) of 
16 December 2008.
54 See also Article 1 in Protocol 1 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms (20 March 1952).
55 See among others Axel Springer AG v Germany (n 3), para. 87. See also Moosavian, 
Deconstructing ‘Public Interest’ in the Article 8 vs Article 10 Balancing Exercise, 6(2) Journal of 
Media Law (2014) pp. 40 ff. and Jacobs, White & Ovey, (n 6) pp. 449 ff.
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tion, and his equipment had not been confiscated – he was only convicted for disobeying 
the police.56
 The Court noted that the case fell within the ambit of Article 10 because ‘his ex-
ercise of his journalistic functions had been adversely affected as he was present at the scene 
as a newspaper photographer in order to report on the events’.57
 At the same time the Court emphasised that even though journalists may face a 
conflict between their general duty to abide by ordinary criminal law and their profes-
sional duty to obtain and disseminate information, thus enabling the media to play its 
essential role as public watchdog, 
it has to be emphasised that the concept of responsible journalism requires that when-
ever a journalist – as well as his or her employer – has to make a choice between the 
two duties and if he or she makes this choice to the detriment of the duty to abide by 
ordinary criminal law, such journalist has to be aware that he or she assumes the risk of 
being subject to legal sanctions, including those of a criminal character, by not obeying 
the lawful orders of, inter alia, the police.58
This is a rather incisive remark that leaves the risk of a conviction solely on the journalist’s 
shoulders. This must also be the outcome in the above-mentioned trespassing cases – 
especially if the trespassing has induced a serious violation of the owner’s right to privacy. 
4.5. Journalists’ Own Defamatory Statements
From time to time journalists are involved in cases of defamation. In the following I will 
briefly outline the state of the law in this field.
 Firstly, it is important to make a main distinction between cases where the jour-
nalist expresses her- or himself in a private dispute, even if this is done in public, and 
cases where the journalist is acting as a journalist. If the journalist makes defamatory 
remarks in a private role, she or he must be treated in the same way as anybody else, since 
the special status that journalists enjoy in a democratic society related to freedom of ex-
pression does not, as mentioned above, relate to their own capacity, so to speak, but to 
their function as the public watchdog. In the Janowski case, in which Janowski was found 
guilty of making insulting remarks about some municipal guards, the Court stated that 
the insulting remarks did not ‘involve the issue of freedom of the press since the applicant, 
although a journalist by profession, clearly acted as a private individual on this occasion’.59 
56 See Pentikäinen v. Finland, appl. no. 11882/10, 20.10.2015 (Grand Chamber), para 89.
57 Ibid. para 83.
58 Ibid. para 110.
59 See Janowski v Poland, appl. no. 25716/94, 21.1.1999 (Grand Chamber), para. 32.
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 Secondly, it is important to make a distinction between cases where the journalist 
merely reports statements made by another person in an interview or reports from a de-
bate or a conference, and cases where the journalist disseminates her or his own remarks. 
As discussed above, journalists have a reporting privilege, and to punish a journalist for 
her or his reporting would seriously hamper the contribution of the press to discussions 
of matters of public interest. In this context, punishment should not be contemplated 
unless there are particularly strong reasons for doing so. 
 This leaves us with defamatory cases where the journalist comments (as a jour-
nalist) on a matter following exhaustive research. In such cases a fair balance must be 
struck between the journalist’s right to freedom of expression and the third party’s right 
to protection of her or his reputation as covered by Article 8 of the Convention. It is to be 
noted that in order for Article 8 to come into play an attack on a person’s reputation must 
attain a certain level of seriousness and in a manner causing prejudice to personal enjoy-
ment of the right to respect privacy. Article 8 cannot be relied on in order to complain 
about a loss of reputation which is the foreseeable consequence of one’s own actions.60 
 On several occasions, the Court has emphasised that the outcome of a case should 
not, in principle, vary according to whether it has been lodged by the journalist under 
Article 10 or under Article 8 by the person who is the subject of the article or broadcast. 
This is because, as stated above, both of these rights deserve equal respect.61
 In these, as well as in other defamatory cases, the Court requires the domes-
tic courts to distinguish between statements of fact (factual allegations) and value judg-
ments.62 This is due to an assessment in accordance with the requirement in Article 10 (2) 
of ‘necessary in a democratic society’. While the existence of facts can be demonstrated, the 
truth of value judgments is not susceptible of proof.63 
 If the topic is of public interest and the statement constitutes a statement of fact, 
an interference with the journalist’s freedom of expression is not necessary in a demo-
cratic society if the allegation is proven true, or if the journalist has acted in good faith on 
an accurate factual basis and has provided reliable and precise information in accordance 
with the ethics of journalism.64 The Court has enumerated five additional criteria65 that 
are relevant for balancing the right to freedom of expression and the right to respect for 
private life: (1) how well-known the person concerned is and what is the subject of the 
60 Such as the commission of a criminal offence. See Axel Springer AG v Germany (n 3), para. 83.
61 See Axel Springer AG v Germany (n 3), para. 87.
62 See also Harris, O’Boyle & Warbrick (n 10) pp. 697 ff.
63 See for instance OOOVesti and Ukhou v Russia, appl.no. 21724/03, 30.5.2013, para. 64. 
64 See for instance Pedersen and Baadsgaard v Denmark, appl. no. 49017/99, 17.12.2004, para. 71 
ff., Björk Eidsdottir v Iceland, appl. no. 46443/09, 10.7.2012, para. 66 ff. and Prompt v. France (n 
8), para 47. 
65 Besides the criterion of the public interest. See also Harris, O’Boyle & Warbrick (n 10) pp. 692 ff.
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report; (2) the prior conduct of the person concerned; (3) the method used to obtain the 
information and its veracity; (4) the content, form and consequences of the publication; 
and (5) the severity of the sanction imposed.66
 If the topic is of public interest, but the statement instead constitutes a value judg-
ment, interference in the journalist’s freedom of expression will not be necessary in a 
democratic society if there is a sufficient factual basis to support the statement, and the 
statement is reasonable under the circumstances.67 These criteria are rather vague, but 
according to the Court’s case law the following three indicators can be of guidance: how 
coarse the statement is, the circumstances in which the statement was put forward, and 
the relevance of the statement in correlation with the topic. The interference objected to 
must be looked at in the light of the case as a whole.
 In Niskasaari and Otavamedia Oy v Finland the journalist (Niskasaari) had been 
found guilty of defaming another journalist and was fined EUR 240, with EUR 2000 pay-
able in damages. The applicant had published articles in which he criticised the manner 
in which two TV documentaries had been made. In particular the applicant alleged that 
some figures used in the documentaries had been fabricated and that the evidence of one 
researcher had been included in one of the documentaries even though one of the report-
ers knew it to be false. 
 The Court determined that the topic of the articles – the limits of critical and 
investigative journalism – was clearly a matter of legitimate public interest. Both parties 
were professional journalists who were relatively well-known to the general public. The 
complainant had been given the opportunity to reply – which he did – and no details of 
the articles were obtained by subterfuge or other illicit means. The Court also attached 
importance to the fact that the complainant was an investigative journalist involved in 
making TV documentaries on controversial issues for a public broadcasting company. 
Consequently, he was engaged in an activity very much in the public domain, in a manner 
and in circumstances where he could himself expect to be the subject of robust scrutiny, 
comment and criticism regarding his professional conduct. In addition, the Court noted 
the severity of the sanctions imposed on the applicant. All this, together with the fact that 
the national courts had not conducted a proper examination of the case in accordance 
with Article 10 of the Convention and the Court’s case law, made the Court consider that 
there had been a violation of Article 10.68
 This case is interesting, not just because it shows a dispute between two journal-
ists and thereby that journalists from time to time also must get a taste of her or his own 
66 See Axel Springer AG v Germany (n 3), para. 89 ff. and Niskasaari and Otavamedia OY v Finland 
(n 8), para. 49.
67 See Tusalp v Turkey, appl. no. 32131/08, 21.2.2012, para. 43.
68 See Niskasaari and Otavamedia Oy v Finland (n 8), para. 50 ff.
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medicine, but also because it shows that striking a fair balance requires consideration of 
the case as a whole, including the behaviour of both parties. Finally, the case shows the 
importance of the national courts’ examination of the case. 
 The national courts must apply standards which are in conformity with the prin-
ciples embodied in Article 10 and the national courts must adduce reasons that are rele-
vant and sufficient. 
	
5. Concluding Remarks
Journalists and the press have a duty to impart information and ideas on all matters of 
public interest. Not only does the press have this task, the public has a right to receive 
such information and ideas. This gives journalists an essential role in a democratic soci-
ety.
 On the other hand, freedom of expression is not the only valuable human right. 
The right to privacy is also of significance. As mentioned above, these two rights; the 
right to freedom of expression and the right to privacy, are of equal value and deserve 
equal respect. It is not in the interest of society that freedom of expression at any price 
takes precedent over the right to privacy, sacrificing the latter. A fair balance must be 
struck between the competing interests. In striking that balance the courts must, among 
other criteria, weigh the importance for society of the subject of the article or the broad-
cast against the intrusive or harmful effect on the individual. 
 In the old days, the domestic criminal courts dealt with very few cases in which 
journalists stood on trial. Today, such cases form a separate category. Every year the 
Court delivers a number of judgments regarding journalists – especially compared with 
the number of journalists in Europe and the fact that journalists do not operate alone in 
the news market, since many young people get all their information from social media, 
that is information not necessarily provided by a journalist. The volume of judgments of 
the courts is not due to the fact that today more events worthy of reporting take place. It 
is evident, that part of the reason is that freedom of expression of journalists is attributed 
more significance today because of the recognition of the essential role of this freedom in 
a democratic society. 
 At the same time it also appears as if the significance of freedom of expression 
makes some journalists believe that they are sacrosanct and therefore above the law. It 
also makes some journalists believe that in the balancing between the competing inter-
ests (normally freedom of expression and the right to privacy) the fairness always is on 
the side of free speech. As shown, this cannot be accepted. Journalists are free to do all 
the things free people are free to do in a free society but, apart from the special privilege 
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attached to reporting, journalists are, in principle, not released from their duty to obey 
the ordinary criminal law. Article 10 only affords them immunity in exceptional circum-
stances. This applies in particular if the concrete criminal law provision does not by its 
nature constitute a limitation of freedom of expression. Of course, the special status of 
journalists as public watchdogs is to be considered seriously in every single case, but the 
bedrock principles that lie behind freedom of expression dictate that journalists are not 
to be treated as a state within the state and immune to the rule of law. The job description 
of journalists must therefore take criminal law into account. 
 So the answer is ‘No’. Journalists are not to be punished for doing their job, pro-
vided that they do not overstep certain bounds, particularly the bounds set by the ethics 
of journalism and the ordinary criminal law as interpreted in conformity with Article 10 
and the Court’s case law. 
